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OIL AND GAS LITIGATION UPDATE FOR THE  
NORTH DAKOTA STATE COURTS 
MARK D. CHRISTIANSEN* 
ABSTRACT 
 
In 2014, North Dakota encountered a wide variety of oil and gas 
industry legal issues involving dealings between landowners and oil and gas 
lessees and operators, the interpretation of oil and gas leases, surface use 
rights, North Dakota’s abandoned mineral statutes, the status of claims for 
unpaid royalties in bankruptcy, and alleged frivolous lawsuits.  In many 
instances, the facts of the particular case drove the outcome and rulings of 
the court.  However, these recent court decisions have further developed the 
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The following decisions of the North Dakota Supreme Court, as well as 
one example of the rulings issued by the federal district courts of North 
Dakota, are indicative of the continuing growth of oil and gas litigation in 
this state. 
I. NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVERSES SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT RULING IN FAVOR OF OIL AND GAS LESSEE IN 
SUIT BY MINERAL OWNERS FOR FRAUD IN THE 
INDUCEMENT IN THE EXECUTION OF OIL AND GAS LEASES 
In Golden Eye Resources, LLC v. Ganske,1 the mineral owners had 
engaged in extensive negotiations with Golden Eye, which led to their 
execution of oil and gas leases in favor of Golden Eye in December 2009.  
On May 28, 2010, the mineral owners sent Golden Eye a notice of 
rescission seeking to rescind the leases for fraud in the inducement on the 
grounds that a series of representations Golden Eye allegedly made to the 
mineral owners prior to their granting of the leases were false.2  The 
mineral owners offered to return all payments to Golden Eye as part of the 
proposed rescission.3 
“Golden Eye sued [the mineral owners] to quiet title to the lease 
interests and sought damages for breach of contract and intentional 
interference with contract.”4  The mineral owners answered and 
counterclaimed, seeking rescission or cancellation of the leases.5  On 
multiple motions and cross-motions for summary judgment, the district 
court rejected and dismissed all claims, except the court quieted title to the 
leases in Golden Eye.6  The court found that certain representations 
contradicted the terms of the leases and were therefore barred by the parole 
evidence rule.7  It further found that “the remaining misrepresentations 
constituted mere ‘sales talk,’ ‘puffery,’ or ‘opinion’ and were not material 
 
1.  2014 ND 179, 853 N.W.2d 544. 
2.  Id. ¶ 4, 853 N.W.2d at 548. 
3.  Id. 
4.  Id. ¶ 6. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. 
7.  Id. ¶ 15, 853 N.W.2d at 550. 
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to the [mineral owners’] fraudulent inducement claims.”8 Both the mineral 
owners and Golden Eye appealed.9 
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the dispositive issue in 
the appeal was “whether the district court erred in granting summary 
judgment dismissing the [mineral owners’] claims they were fraudulently 
induced into signing the leases by Golden Eye’s alleged 
misrepresentations.”10  The court found that actual fraud is always a 
question of fact, and that “because ‘intent to defraud and deceive is 
ordinarily not susceptible of direct proof, fraud . . . may be inferred from the 
circumstances at the time of the transaction.’”11 
The mineral owners alleged that Golden Eye made a series of factual 
misrepresentations to induce the mineral owners into leasing to Golden Eye 
instead of another company.  The district court’s order listed many of the 
alleged representations, including the following: 
1. That Golden Eye itself would drill the wells and develop the 
[mineral owners’] minerals. . . . 
4. That Golden Eye would drill the [mineral owners’] minerals as 
soon as they obtained a drilling rig and would drill the [mineral 
owners’] minerals first. . . . 
6. That Golden Eye had acquired 7,000 net mineral acres in the 
Tyrone Township, where the Defendants’ property is located, and 
was developing that township. . . . 
10. That Golden Eye had operating/drilling control over the 
sections where the Defendants’ minerals were located. . . .12 
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by recognizing 
that, while the parol evidence rule “generally cannot be used to vary or 
contradict the terms of a complete, written contract adopted as a definite 
expression of the parties’ agreement,”13 parol evidence may be used by the 
parties and considered by the court “when the written agreement does not 
reflect the parties’ intent because of fraud, mistake, or accident.”14  The 
court noted that this exception to the rule “applies even if the evidence 
contradicts or conflicts with the terms of the written agreement.”15  The 
 
8.  Id. 
9.  Id. ¶ 1, 853 N.W.2d at 547. 
10.  Id. ¶ 9, 853 N.W.2d at 549. 
11.  Id. ¶ 11 (quoting Am. Bank. Ctr. v. Weist, 2010 ND 251, ¶ 12, 793 N.W.2d 172, 178). 
12.  Id. ¶ 13, 853 N.W.2d at 550. 
13.  Id. ¶ 17, 853 N.W.2d at 551. 
14.  Id.  
15.  Id. ¶ 18. 
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court found that the mineral owners were not seeking to enforce the alleged 
misrepresentations and oral promises, but were instead asking the court “to 
entirely rescind the leases because of the fraudulent inducement.”16  
Consequently, the parol evidence rule simply had no application to bar the 
presentation of parol evidence in support of the mineral owners’ claims.17 
With regard to the trial court’s finding that the remaining statements 
relied upon by the mineral owners were mere sales talk, puffery or opinion, 
the appellate court found “[t]he alleged misrepresentations in this case go 
well beyond mere puffery, sales talk, or opinion, and specifically averred 
past or present facts which Golden Eye allegedly knew to be untrue.”18  The 
court distinguished predictions of future events that generally do not 
constitute fraud.19  The court found that the trial court erred in disregarding 
the alleged misrepresentations as being either impermissible parol evidence 
or as being puffery or the like that was immaterial to the mineral owners’ 
claims for fraudulent inducement.20  It reversed the summary judgment 
rulings of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings 
consistent with the opinion.21 
II. NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT INTERPRETS THE 
INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE DRILLING OPERATIONS CLAUSE 
AND THE PUGH CLAUSE OF AN OIL AND GAS LEASE 
In Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp.,22 the court was presented with 
Citation’s appeal of a district court summary judgment ruling in favor of 
Tank quieting title to an oil and gas lease that described the leased premises 
as being the northwest quarter and south half of section 10, township 151 
north, range 96 west, McKenzie County, North Dakota.23  The oil and gas 
lease at issue in the case was signed in 1982, and the history of oil and gas 
activity described by the court commenced in May 1983.24  The court found 
that two specific clauses contained in the oil and gas lease had the greatest 
relevance to the issues in dispute between Citation and Tank.  The “drilling 
operations clause” provided: 
 
16.  Id. ¶ 21, 823 N.W.2d at 552. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. ¶ 24, 853 N.W.2d at 553. 
19.  Id. ¶ 25. 
20.  Id. ¶ 26. 
21.  Id. 
22.  2014 ND 123, 848 N.W.2d 691. 
23.  Id. ¶ 2, 848 N.W.2d at 694. 
24.  Id. 
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Notwithstanding anything in this lease contained to the contrary, it 
is expressly agreed that if Lessee shall commence operations for 
drilling at any time while this lease is in force, this lease shall 
remain in force and its terms shall continue so long as operations 
are continuously prosecuted and, if production results therefrom, 
then as long as production continues.  As used in this lease 
continuously prosecuted shall mean that not more than thirty days 
shall elapse without operations on any well or that not more than 
ninety days shall elapse between the completion or abandonment 
of one well and the beginning of operations for the drilling of a 
subsequent well.25 
The court found this clause provided that the lease would remain in 
force and effect as long as drilling operations were continuously prosecuted 
and, if production resulted therefrom, then as long as production 
continued.26 
However, the oil and gas lease also contained a “Pugh clause,” which 
the district court found “severed the lease allowing it to become divisible 
and allowing the lease on the southwest quarter to expire.”27  The Pugh 
clause provided as follows: 
Nothwithstanding any provision in this lease to the contrary, if, at 
the end of the one year period from the end of the primary term 
hereof, this lease is maintained in full force and effect by virtue of 
production of oil and/or gas, this lease shall nevertheless expire as 
to all that part of said lands not included in a producing unit unless 
operations for the drilling of a well have been conducted during 
such one-year period.  Lessee may continue to hold this lease in 
full force and effect as to all of said lands for subsequent and 
successive periods of one year by conducing [sic] additional 
drilling operations on undeveloped portions of said lands during 
each preceding one-year period.  Should Lessee fail to conduct 
drilling operations during any such one-year period, then this lease 
shall expire as to said lands not included in producing units at the 
end of the one-year period during which no drilling operations 
were conducted.  The term “producing unit” as used herein shall 
mean the following number of acres: 
 
25.  Id. ¶ 12, 848 N.W.2d at 696. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. ¶ 14, 848 N.W.2d at 697. 
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A. The number of acres in the drilling and spacing unit allocated to 
each producing well as determined by the appropriate governing 
body of the State of North Dakota. 
B. In the absence of rules and regulations promulgated by the 
appropriate state governing body, the number of acres in a 
producing unit for each producing well shall be approximately one 
hundred and sixty as to oil or six hundred forty as to gas.28 
The district court ruled that the lease terminated as to the southwest 
quarter by operation of the Pugh clause of the lease.  Specifically, it found 
(a) that the Pugh clause applied each successive one-year period after the 
expiration of the primary terms of the lease, (b) that the only well in the 
southwest quarter ceased producing on October 1, 2008, (c) that the drilling 
of the new well in a new spacing unit that included the southwest quarter 
commenced no earlier than October 30, 2009, and (d) none of the savings 
clauses of the oil and gas lease extended the lease through October 30, 
2009, and none of those clauses prevented the expiration of the lease as to 
the southwest quarter.29 
Citation contended that the court misinterpreted the terms of the lease, 
that the Pugh clause did not apply, and that the lease was held in force as to 
all of the lands described in the lease by operation of the drilling operations 
clause.30  Specifically, Citation argued (a) that the above-quoted Pugh 
clause expressly provides that it is only operative at the end of the one-year 
period following the end of the primary term of the lease, (b) that the 
conditions required in order for the Pugh clause to effect the expiration of 
the lease as to the southwest quarter were not met because, at the end of that 
one-year period after the primary term, the southwest quarter was included 
in a producing unit, and (c) that the first sentence of the Pugh clause makes 
that clause operative only one time—i.e., on July 15, 1990, one year after 
the end of the primary term, when the southwest quarter was held by 
production.31 
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court agreed that the first 
sentence of the Pugh clause focuses on the first year after the expiration of 
the primary term.  However, it found that Citation “fail[ed] to consider the 
rest of the paragraph.”32  The court concluded that when the Pugh clause is 
 
28.  Id. ¶ 15. 
29.  Id. ¶ 7, 848 N.W.2d at 695. 
30.  Id. ¶ 11, 848 N.W.2d at 696. 
31.  Id. ¶ 16, 848 N.W.2d at 697-98. 
32.  Id. ¶ 17, 848 N.W.2d at 698. 
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read as a whole,33 it provides that the lease would expire at the end of each 
successive one-year period after the primary term as to lands not included in 
a producing unit, unless additional drilling operations attributable to the 
non-producing lands were conducted during that one-year period.34  As a 
result, the lease expired as to the southwest quarter by operation of the Pugh 
clause. 
The court addressed one particularly interesting contract interpretation 
issue while reaching its opinion.  Both the Pugh clause and the drilling 
operations clause stated that they applied notwithstanding any contrary 
provision in the lease.  However, the court found the two provisions to be in 
conflict.35  This presented the dilemma of how a court should give effect to 
language in a contract that states that each of two clauses that conflict with 
each other are to be given superseding and controlling effect over all other 
provisions of the contract.  Which provision truly controls over the other? 
The North Dakota Supreme Court cited the contract and oil and gas 
lease interpretation principles that generally provide that (a) contracts are, 
to the extent possible, interpreted in a way that gives effect to every 
provision of the contract if reasonably practicable, and (b) oil and gas leases 
are “often construed most favorably to the lessor because the lessee usually 
drafts the lease and has more experience drafting the lease to give himself 
an advantage.”36  Finding that Pugh clauses are generally included to 
protect the lessor, the court observed that if it interpreted the two provisions 
the way Citation advocated, “the drilling operations clause would supersede 
the Pugh clause and the Pugh clause would become meaningless.”37  
Because of those considerations, and in order to give effect to both 
provisions of the lease, the court concluded that the Pugh clause modified 
the drilling operations clause.38 
Finally, the court distinguished its prior ruling in Egeland v. 
Continental Resources, Inc.39 in which the court ruled in favor of the lessee 
in a similar dispute over the interplay between the Pugh clause and the 
drilling operations clause of a lease.  The court in Tank observed that 
“[b]ecause Pugh clauses vary widely in form, the interpretation of how a 
 
33.  Id. 
34.  Id. ¶ 18. 
35.  Id. ¶ 27, 848 N.W.2d at 700. 
36.  Id. ¶ 28 (citing West v. Alpar Res., Inc., 298 N.W.2d 484, 490-91 (N.D. 1980)). 
37.  Id. 
38.  Id. 
39.  2000 ND 169, ¶ 31, 616 N.W.2d 861, 870-71. 
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Pugh clause may affect other provisions in a lease may also vary.”40  
Because the language of the lease provisions in Egeland varied from the 
provisions at issue in Tank, the court found the analysis in Egeland 
inapplicable.41  Accordingly, the court affirmed the ruling of the district 
court granting summary judgment in favor of the mineral owner. 
III. NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT DETERMINES WHETHER 
OTHER OWNERS AND SUCCESSOR OPERATOR ARE LIABLE 
TO THE ROYALTY OWNERS IN A UNIT FOR ROYALTIES 
OWED PRIOR TO THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE FORMER 
OPERATOR 
In Van Sickle v. Hallmark Associates, Inc.,42 the plaintiffs (the “Van 
Sickles”) owned royalty interests in the Missouri Breaks Unit No. 1 well.43  
Comanche Oil was the original lessee and operator of the four underlying 
oil and gas leases.44  However, it later assigned the leases to Alpha Gas 
Corp., who became the successor operator.45  Alpha later conveyed an 
approximate fifty percent of the working interest rights in the leases to other 
parties (the “Interest Holders”).46 
In 2002, Alpha filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the United 
States Bankruptcy Code.47  In 2005, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed and 
approved a plan of reorganization, which provided for the formation of an 
entity named Missouri Breaks, LLC and the transfer of Alpha’s 
approximate fifty percent working interest in the subject well to that 
entity.48  The plan required that Missouri Breaks pay Alpha’s creditors in 
accordance with the terms of the plan using the revenue from its working 
interest rights.49  The plan required that, in order to receive payment, the 
creditors had to file a claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.50 
 
40.  Tank, ¶ 32, 848 N.W.2d at 701. 
41.  Id. 
42.  2013 ND 218, 840 N.W.2d 92.  It should be noted that the opinion in this case was 
issued on November 25, 2013.  However, proceedings on a request for rehearing continued into 
2014, so that this case is considered appropriate for inclusion in this paper that focuses on 2014 
litigation. 
43.  Id. ¶ 3, 840 N.W.2d at 96. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (2012)). 
48.  Id. ¶ 4. 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. 
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The Van Sickles “did not file a claim with the bankruptcy court, and 
neither the plan nor the bankruptcy court’s final order included their 
claim.”51  However, it was also undisputed that the Van Sickles “were not 
listed as creditors in Alpha’s bankruptcy case . . . [and] had no notice of 
Alpha’s bankruptcy proceedings . . . .”52  The evidence in the case showed 
that Missouri Breaks had made certain royalty payments to the Van Sickles 
after confirmation of the plan of reorganization. 
In 2006, the Van Sickles sued the Interest Holders and Missouri 
Breaks—who collectively owned the full working interest in the oil and gas 
leases—for unpaid royalties.  The Van Sickles asserted claims of 
conversion, intentional tortious interference, and breach of contract.53  They 
also sued for royalties on oil and gas produced prior to the confirmation of 
the plan of reorganization.54  Extensive district court and appellate 
proceedings followed, as detailed in the opinion of the court.  Those 
proceedings ultimately led to the appeal in which the North Dakota 
Supreme Court addressed a series of issues. 
First, on the issue of whether Missouri Breaks was liable for Alpha’s 
debts under the state-law doctrine of successor liability, the court noted that 
“[t]he long-established general rule is that a corporation which purchases 
the assets of another corporation does not succeed to the liabilities of the 
selling corporation.”55  However, the court noted several exceptions to this 
general rule, including situations in which “there is an express or an implied 
agreement to assume the transferor’s liability.”56  In the present case, the 
court found that, under section 5.2 of the plan of reorganization, “Missouri 
Breaks ‘expressly assumed’ the four leases under which the well 
operates.”57  Under 11 United States Code section 365(b), Missouri Breaks’ 
assumption of the leases carried with it “the requirement to cure any 
defaults in the unexpired leases.”58  The court concluded that Alpha’s prior 
failure to pay royalties was a default under the oil and gas leases that 
 
51.  Id. (citing Van Sickle v. Hallmark & Assocs., Inc., 2008 ND 12, ¶ 14, 744 N.W.2d 532, 
537). 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id. ¶ 5. 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. ¶ 20, 840 N.W.2d at 99 (quoting Benson v. SRT Commc’ns, Inc., 2012 ND 58, ¶ 20, 
813 N.W.2d 552, 559). 
56.  Id. at 100 (quoting Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Products, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121 
(N.D. 1984)). 
57.  Id. ¶ 23, 840 N.W.2d at 100-01. 
58.  Id. ¶ 24, 840 N.W.2d at 101. 
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needed to be cured upon Missouri Breaks’ assumption of the leases and 
succession to Alpha’s ownership.59 
Second, the court rejected the defendants’ assertion that Missouri 
Breaks received Alpha’s oil and gas leases “free and clear” from Alpha’s 
debts prior to the confirmation of the plan of reorganization “because the 
Van Sickles did not receive notice of the bankruptcy proceedings and the 
confirmation order and reorganization plan are simply not binding on the 
Van Sickles.”60 
Third, the court found that under the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor cannot 
simply retain the favorable aspects of a contract and avoid the burdensome 
provisions of the contract.61  Rather, the debtor must either assume or reject 
the entire contract, both benefits and burdens.62  The court observed that 
“[t]his is consistent with our state law regarding implied contracts and 
assignments.”63  The court concluded that, under the facts presented, 
Missouri Breaks “implicitly agreed to assume its statutory liability to the 
Van Sickles for the unpaid pre-confirmation royalties, which were not 
discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings.”64 
IV. CLAIMANTS TO UNRECORDED SEVERED MINERAL 
INTEREST CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF, AND THE 
SURFACE OWNERS’ COMPLIANCE WITH, NORTH DAKOTA’S 
ABANDONED MINERAL STATUTES 
In Capps v. Weflen,65 the North Dakota Supreme Court addressed an 
appeal of a proceeding involving the application of the state’s abandoned 
mineral statutes66 to a mineral interest conveyed by a 1979 mineral deed 
that was not recorded until 2009.  The defendants (the Weflens), owners of 
property in which the plaintiffs continued to claim ownership of the  
long-unrecorded mineral interest, followed through with the various steps 
and procedures required by the abandoned mineral statutes in order to 
acquire ownership of the alleged abandoned mineral interest.67  The attempt 
to claim ownership began with the publication, on December 28, 2005, of 
 
59.  Id. ¶ 29, 840 N.W.2d at 102. 
60.  Id. ¶ 31, 840 N.W.2d at 103. 
61.  Id. ¶ 32. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id.  
64.  Id. ¶ 37, 840 N.W.2d at 105. 
65.  2014 ND 201, 855 N.W.2d 637. 
66.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-06 (2013). 
67.  Capps, ¶ 3, 855 N.W.2d at 640. 
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the first in a series of notices of the lapse of the mineral interest and 
culminated in the recordation of a termination of mineral interest, affidavit 
of publication, affidavit of mailing, and notice of lapse of mineral interest in 
the real estate records on March 6, 2006.68 
While on a trip to the area in 2008, the spouse of one of the plaintiffs 
(the Capps) “noticed oil wells in the area of the Weflens’ property.”69  
Concerned with that oil and gas development, the Capps filed a statement of 
claim in 2008.70  In 2009, the Capps recorded the 1979 mineral deed and 
sued the Weflens to quiet title to the mineral interest.71  The district court 
found that the Weflens had no claim to the mineral interest of the Capps 
because the Weflens had failed to comply with the notice requirements 
specified in the abandoned mineral statutes.72  The Weflens appealed that 
ruling. 
The North Dakota Supreme Court, beginning its review of the district 
court’s order granting summary judgment against the Weflens on the 
ground that they failed to comply with the notice provisions of the 
abandoned mineral statutes, noted that “[t]here is no dispute that the subject 
mineral interests were unused for more than 20 years within the meaning of 
[North Dakota Century Code section] 38-18.1-03, and that no statement of 
claim was filed within 60 days after first publication of the notice of 
lapse.”73  However, the lower court found that the Weflens failed to comply 
with the statutes: 
The district court listed three reasons why the Weflens failed to 
comply with the statutory provisions:  1) the Weflens “had 
knowledge that Ruth Nelson was dead at the time they mailed” the 
notice of lapse to her addresses of record, and “[m]ailing notice to 
a dead person at their address of record is absurd;”  2) “[m]ailing 
notice certified, restricted delivery is not required and mailing 
notice to a dead person by certified, restrictive delivery guarantees 
notice will not be received by the mineral owner;” and 3) because 
“property devolves to the deceased’s heirs upon death” under the 
provisions of the North Dakota Uniform Probate Code, [North 
Dakota Century Code title 30.1], the record owner was no longer 
the actual owner, and therefore the actual owner’s address “did not 
 
68.  Id. 
69.  Id. ¶ 4. 
70.  Id. 
71.  Id. at 640-41. 
72.  Id. at 641. 
73.  Id. ¶ 8, 855 N.W.2d at 642.  
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appear of record” which necessitated a “reasonable inquiry” for the 
address of the actual mineral interest owner.74 
The court reviewed each of the reasons described above and concluded 
that the district court’s rationale conflicted with North Dakota Century 
Code chapter 38-18.1 and the North Dakota Supreme Court’s 
interpretations of those statutes. 
First, the court found that it was immaterial whether the Weflens had 
actual knowledge of the death of the predecessor in interest to Capps, who 
was still the record owner of the mineral interest and the person to whom 
the statutory notices had been mailed by the Weflens.  The court cited prior 
precedent75 rejecting the reasoning behind this first basis for the decision 
below, and the court noted that the plaintiff successors to the mineral 
interest would have received notice if they had recorded notice of their 
current addresses and succession in the real estate records.76  Second, with 
respect to the Capps’ contention that Weflens’ use of certified mail with 
restricted delivery violated the procedures required under North Dakota 
Century Code section 38-18.1-06(2), the court found that the abandoned 
mineral statutes do not specify the type of mailing required and do not 
forbid the use of any particular type of mailing.77  The Weflens were free to 
use certified mail in sending the notice of lapse.78 
Third, the court concluded that the district court erred in finding that 
the Weflens were obligated to search for heirs of a deceased mineral interest 
owner whose address appeared of record in order to fulfill the requirements 
of North Dakota Century Code section 38-18.1-06(2).79  Rather, a surface 
owner invoking the abandoned mineral statutes is only required to conduct 
a reasonable inquiry if the mineral owner’s address does not appear in the 
real estate records.80  This is true even where the surface owner has actual 
knowledge that the mineral owner whose address appears of record is 
deceased.81 
The Capps argued, in the alternative, that even if the Weflens were 
determined to have complied with the statutory provisions, the notice 
provisions of the abandoned minerals statutes violate due process and are 
 
74.  Id. ¶ 9, 855 N.W.2d at 642 (brackets appearing in original text). 
75.  Id. ¶ 10. 
76.  Id. at 643. 
77.  Id. ¶ 11, 855 N.W.2d at 643. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. ¶ 12. 
80.  Id. ¶ 13, 855 N.W.2d at 644. 
81.  Id. 
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unconstitutional as applied in this case.82  In support of this contention, the 
Capps cited the landmark decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co.,83 in which the United States Supreme Court held: 
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any 
proceeding which is to be according finality is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested 
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an 
opportunity to present their objections.84 
The district court rejected this contention.  While agreeing with the 
district court in this respect, the North Dakota Supreme Court, among other 
comments, noted the following findings of the United States Supreme Court 
in a decision upholding the constitutionality of Indiana’s Mineral Lapse 
Act, which is similar to the North Dakota statutes: 
The reasoning in Mullane is applicable to a judicial proceeding 
brought to determine whether a lapse of a mineral estate did or did 
not occur, but not to the self-executing feature of the Mineral 
Lapse Act.  The due process standards of Mullane apply to an 
“adjudication” that is “to be accorded finality.”85 
The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case 
for entry of judgment quieting title to the mineral interest in favor of the 
Weflens.86 
V. NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT FINDS THAT ANY 
DEFECT IN MAILING OF REQUIRED NOTICE OF LAPSE OF 
MINERAL INTEREST UNDER NORTH DAKOTA’S 
ABANDONED MINERALS PROCEDURE WILL NOT DEPRIVE 
THE COURT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER 
DEFENDANT IN A SUBSEQUENT QUIET TITLE ACTION 
In Peterson v. Estate of Jasmanka,87 the personal representative of the 
Estate of Lester Jasmanka, deceased (the “defendant”), appealed the trial 
court’s order denying her motion to vacate a 1990 default judgment 
 
82.  Id. ¶ 14. 
83.  339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
84.  Capps, ¶ 16, 855 N.W.2d at 644-45 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314). 
85.  Id. ¶ 19, 855 N.W.2d at 646 (quoting Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 535-36 
(1982)). 
86.  Id. ¶ 24, 855 N.W.2d at 647. 
87.  2014 ND 40, 842 N.W.2d 920. 
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quieting title to certain mineral interests in the Petersons.88  The underlying 
factual background included a 1952 deed under which Jasmanka conveyed 
certain property but reserved a fifty-percent mineral interest.89  This deed 
listed Jasmanka’s address as “5506 Modoc Avenue in Richmond, 
California.”90  In 1959, Jasmanka executed two oil and gas leases that each 
listed his address as being “5505 Modoc Avenue”91 in Richmond, 
California.92  Both the deed and the leases were recorded.93  The Petersons 
owned the surface of the lands underlain by the defendant’s reserved 
mineral interest.94  Jasmanka died in California in 1963.95 
Thereafter, in 1990, when there had been no use of the minerals for 
more than thirty years, the Petersons “published a notice of lapse of mineral 
interest in the official county newspaper.  The Petersons also mailed a 
notice of lapse of mineral interest to [the defendant] at 5505 Modoc 
Avenue.”96  The present quiet title suit followed, and the Petersons 
continued to use the 5505 Modoc Avenue address for further service on, 
and notice to, the defendant.  When the defendant filed no response or 
appearance in the quiet title suit, the district court entered a default 
judgment quieting title in the mineral rights in the Petersons.97 
“In 2012, 49 years after Jasmanka’s death and 22 years after entry of 
the default judgment quieting title to the minerals in the Petersons,”98 the 
defendant moved to vacate the 1990 default judgment quieting title in the 
Petersons.  The defendant asserted that the 1990 judgment was void 
because the Petersons mailed notice of the lapse of the mineral interest to 
the wrong address and thus failed the requirements of North Dakota’s 
abandoned minerals statute, codified at North Dakota Century Code chapter 
38-18.1.99  The defendant further argued that “the Petersons had 
fraudulently misrepresented to the court that the 5505 Modoc Avenue 
address was the only address of record for Jasmanka,”100 thereby providing 
grounds for vacating the default judgment under North Dakota Rule of Civil 
 
88.  Id. ¶ 1, 842 N.W.2d at 922. 
89.  Id. ¶ 2. 
90.  Id.  
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Id. ¶ 3. 
95.  Id. ¶ 4, 842 N.W.2d at 923. 
96.  Id. ¶ 3, 842 N.W.2d at 922-23. 
97.  Id. at 923. 
98.  Id. ¶ 5, 842 N.W.2d at 923. 
99.  Id. 
100.  Id. 
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Procedure 60(b)(3).  The district court rejected these arguments and denied 
the motion to vacate the default judgment.101  The defendant appealed. 
After reviewing the detailed procedural statutes relied upon by the 
defendant in her appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court described the 
defendant’s argument: 
[Defendant’s] primary contention on appeal is that the district 
court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter the 1990 quiet title 
judgment because the Petersons failed to properly serve the notice 
of lapse of mineral interest upon Jasmanka, the record owner of 
the mineral interest.  [The defendant] in effect contends strict 
compliance with the notice requirements of the statutory 
abandoned minerals procedure under [North Dakota Century Code 
section] 38-18.1-06(2) was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a 
subsequent quiet title action in district court regarding the disputed 
minerals.102 
However, the court noted that its prior decisions have recognized “a 
clear distinction between the statutory abandoned minerals procedure under 
[North Dakota Century Code chapter] 38-18.1 and a subsequent quiet title 
action, and have emphasized they are entirely separate, distinct 
procedures.”103  The issue of “[p]ersonal jurisdiction in a quiet title action is 
determined solely by compliance with the service of process procedures 
under [North Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 4].”104  Thus, the court 
rejected the defendant’s attempt to impose the notice requirements under 
the abandoned minerals procedure as a jurisdictional prerequisite in a 
subsequent quiet title lawsuit.105 
The court concluded that any defect that might have occurred “in the 
mailing of the notice of lapse of mineral interest did not deprive the district 
court of personal jurisdiction” in the quiet title lawsuit.106  Consequently, 
because the judgment was not void, the defendant was not entitled to relief 
under North Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4).107 
VI. NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT AFFIRMS DECISION BY 
THE DISTRICT COURT FINDING THAT WELL OPERATOR’S 
 
101.  Id. 
102.  Id. ¶ 11, 842 N.W.2d at 924. 
103.  Id. ¶ 13, 842 N.W.2d at 925. 
104.  Id. ¶ 14, 842 N.W.2d at 925. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. ¶ 18, 842 N.W.2d at 926. 
107.  Id. 
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LAWSUIT AND CLAIMS AGAINST LANDOWNERS WERE 
WITHOUT REASONABLE CAUSE AND NOT IN GOOD FAITH 
The case of Sagebrush Resources, LLC v. Peterson108 involved the 
appeal of a summary judgment ruling dismissing with prejudice the lawsuit 
Sagebrush Resources filed against the defendant landowners and further 
determining that the action was frivolous and not made in good faith and 
awarding the landowners attorney fees.109  Sagebrush’s lawsuit against the 
landowners asserted, in part, that Sagebrush was the operator of several 
wells and related equipment, the landowners wrongfully entered 
Sagebrush’s property without permission, and the landowners wrongfully 
interfered with Sagebrush’s oil and gas exploration and production 
activities.110  Sagebrush stated that its awareness of the alleged trespass was 
based upon certain encounters with one or more of the landowners, as well 
as its review of complaints and supporting materials the landowners had 
submitted to the North Dakota Industrial Commission, which included 
photos of the various well sites.111 
Sagebrush alleged that it was damaged by the landowners’ actions 
because the landowners filed a series of complaints against Sagebrush with 
the Industrial Commission alleging violations of the statutes and regulations 
that govern oil and gas operations.112  The landowners’ complaints resulted 
in investigations by the Commission that required expenditures by 
Sagebrush and caused the Commission to “withhold its approval of a 
planned sale of Sagebrush’s interests in the affected units, thereby delaying 
said sale.”113  The landowners made various assertions in response to 
Sagebrush’s claims and further alleged that Sagebrush’s lawsuit was 
“frivolous and brought in bad faith for purposes of harassment and 
intimidation.”114  The landowners sought attorney fees and costs under 
North Dakota Century Code sections 28-26-01 and 28-26-31.115 
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the 
landowners on the claims of Sagebrush and additionally found that 
“Sagebrush’s lawsuit was frivolous and was not brought in good faith.”116  
 
108.  2014 ND 3, 841 N.W.2d 705. 
109.  Id. ¶ 1, 841 N.W.2d at 707. 
110.  Id. ¶ 2. 
111.  Id. 
112.  Id. ¶ 4, 841 N.W.2d at 708. 
113.  Id.  
114.  Id. ¶ 3. 
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. ¶ 10, 841 N.W.2d at 710. 
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The court awarded the landowners $23,729 in attorney fees.117  Sagebrush 
did not appeal the summary judgment ruling dismissing its claims against 
the landowners.  However, Sagebrush appealed the district court’s award of 
attorney fees and the finding that its claims were frivolous and not made in 
good faith.118 
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision 
and made the following rulings:  Sagebrush did not establish a valid 
trespass claim.  Under North Dakota law, an oil and gas lessee holds an 
easement in the surface estate for purposes of developing the minerals.119  
An easement is a non-possessory interest in land.120  The essence of a 
trespass to real property is interference with possession of land.121  With 
regard to a possible claim for trespass to chattels, the court found that the 
landowners’ alleged complaints to the Industrial Commission did not 
constitute harm sufficient to support such a claim.122  Second, with regard 
to Sagebrush’s claim for injunctive relief enjoining the landowners from 
interfering with its operation of the lease, the evidence showed that 
Sagebrush had already sold and assigned its interest in the subject lease to 
another company as of the time it filed the present lawsuit.123 
Last, under the deferential standard of review that applied in this 
appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the “district court 
did not misapply the law or act arbitrarily, unreasonably, or unconscionably 
in deciding that”124  Sagebrush had asserted claims “without reasonable 
cause, not in good faith, and found to be untrue.”125  Chief Justice 
VandeWalle, specially concurring in the affirmance of the district court, 
stated his belief that “the oil and gas lessee does have the right and perhaps 
the responsibility to keep people, including the surface owner, off of 
dangerous property the lessee is using to product the oil and gas . . . .”126 
However, Chief Justice VandeWalle found the evidence supported the 
conclusion that, “for retaliatory reasons, Sagebrush attempted to restrict the 
defendants beyond what was necessary to accomplish safety purposes.”127 
 
117.  Id. ¶ 12, 841 N.W.2d at 711. 
118.  Id. ¶ 13. 
119.  Id. ¶ 20, 841 N.W.2d at 713 (emphasis added). 
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. 
122.  Id. ¶ 19. 
123.  Id. ¶ 25, 841 N.W.2d at 714. 
124.  Id. ¶ 26, 841 N.W.2d at 715. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. ¶ 34, 841 N.W.2d at 715-16 (VandeWalle, C.J., specially concurring). 
127.  Id. at 716. 
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VII. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT PRESENTED WITH DISPUTE 
BETWEEN SURFACE OWNERS AND OPERATOR OVER THE 
OPERATOR’S ASSERTED RIGHT TO DRILL A SALT WATER 
DISPOSAL WELL ON LANDS WITHIN A PRODUCTION UNIT 
Finally, this discussion of state court decisions will conclude with one 
federal court opinion that dealt with a series of principles of North Dakota 
oil and gas laws.  The case of Fisher v. Continental Resources, Inc.128 
involved a tract of land in which the surface rights were owned by the 
Fishers and on which Continental proposed to construct and operate a salt 
water disposal well (the “SWD well”).  Beginning on October 26, 2011 and 
continuing through October 1, 2012, Continental personnel and contract 
landmen sent the Fishers a series of five letters advising of Continental’s 
plans to drill on the Fishers’ property; some of the letters referenced a 
proposed SWD well, while others referenced the drilling of an oil and gas 
well.129  On May 20, 2013, Continental received a permit from the North 
Dakota Industrial Commission authorizing it to operate the SWD well for 
salt water disposal purposes.130  Continental thereafter drilled the SWD well 
and laid a pipeline across the subject lands to transport saltwater from the 
well.131 
In July of 2013, the Fishers sued Continental and asserted that 
Continental had no legal right to construct and operate a salt water disposal 
well and pipeline on their property and no right to dispose of salt water in 
the pore space beneath the surface of the subject tract.132  The Fishers 
alleged claims of nuisance, trespass, fraudulent representation, and deceit.  
Continental contended that both North Dakota law and the applicable unit 
agreement for the Cedar Hills North Red River “B” Unit, which included 
the Fisher’s property, authorized its activities even though it did not have a 
salt water disposal agreement in place with the Fishers.133  Continental filed 
a counterclaim seeking a judicial declaration that its disputed activities were 
authorized.134  Before the district court was Continental’s motion for 
summary judgment.135 
 
128.  No.1:13-cv-097, 2014 WL 4410206, at *1 (D.N.D. Sept. 8, 2014). 
129.  Id. at *2. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. 
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. at *3. 
135.  Id. 
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The court began its discussion of applicable law with the recognition 
that the mineral estate in North Dakota is dominant in relation to a severed 
surface estate because the mineral owner has an implied right to use so 
much of the surface estate as is reasonably necessary to explore, develop, 
and transport the minerals.136  The court went on to observe that the North 
Dakota Supreme Court has adopted the “accommodation doctrine” to 
determine issues of reasonable use: 
The test for reasonableness under the “accommodation doctrine” 
requires a consideration of all the pertinent circumstances 
including what are the usual, customary, and reasonable practices 
in the industry, and the nature, condition, location, and current use 
of the servient estate . . .  [W]hether the use of the surface estate by 
the mineral estate is reasonable is a question of fact.137 
The court recognized that under the North Dakota statutes138 the 
surface owners must be compensated for damages to the surface estate 
made in conjunction with oil and gas drilling operations.139 
Seeking summary judgment in its favor, Continental asserted that the 
SWD well and related pipeline were reasonably necessary, and indeed 
required, for the development of the mineral estate within the unit, 
including the minerals underlying the Fisher property.140  The company also 
contended that the language in the unit agreement establishing the rights 
and obligations of the unit operator contemplated salt water disposal 
operations.141  However, the Fishers argued that salt water disposal 
activities were separate and distinct from oil and gas exploration and 
production and could not constitute a reasonable use of the surface.142  The 
court noted that no prior North Dakota court decisions directly addressed 
the issue of whether a unit operator has the general and implied right to 
construct and operate a salt water disposal well as part of unit operations.143 
The court observed that it was not clear from the record whether the 
minerals underlying this tract of land had been leased, although it 
recognized that the owner of the mineral rights in that tract would clearly be 
entitled to a share of unit production by virtue of the applicable unit 
 
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. at *4 (citing Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136-37 (N.D. 1979)). 
138.  Id. at *11 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (2013)). 
139.  Id. at *3. 
140.  Id. at *5. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. 
143.  Id. at *6. 
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agreement.144  Without an oil and gas lease, the court noted that it would 
look to the North Dakota statutes authorizing unitization, the unit 
agreement, and the unit operating agreement.145  After reviewing those 
sources of the operator’s rights in conducting unit operations, the court 
held: 
Section 38-08-09.8 of the North Dakota Century Code, the 
unitization order, the Unit Agreement, and the Unit Operating 
Agreement are broad enough to be read as including an implied 
covenant to drill a salt water disposal well within the Unit in order 
to dispose of salt water produced by Unit operations.  Thus, as 
long as Continental Resources acts in a reasonable manner and 
does not use the [SWD] well to dispose of salt water produced 
outside of the Unit, its actions are not considered unlawful.146 
However, the court further explained that, under North Dakota law, the 
question of whether a particular activity and use of the land is reasonable 
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case (e.g., whether 
reasonable alternatives are available).147  The court concluded that genuine 
issues of material fact remained in dispute or were unknown and that 
Fisher’s trespass and nuisance claims could not be decided at this stage of 
the proceedings through summary judgment procedure.148 
With respect to their additional claims for fraudulent misrepresentation 
and deceit, the Fishers asserted that Continental’s notice letters were 
unclear as to whether Continental intended to drill a new oil and gas well 
or, instead, a salt water disposal well.149  Continental responded that the 
letters were not misleading and, even if the letters were misleading, the 
Fishers could not demonstrate the required element of reliance on the 
letters.150  The court found that, by statute,151 the Fishers were “entitled to 
‘sufficient disclosure of the plan of work and operations to enable the 
surface owner to evaluate the effect of drilling operations on the surface 
owner’s use of the property.’”152  The court also found that while the 
Fishers “may have a number of difficult hurdles at trial to demonstrate that 
 
144.  Id. at *7. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Id. at *9. 
147.  Id. at *9-10. 
148.  Id. at *10. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. 
151.  Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04.1(2)(a) (2013)). 
152.  Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04.1(2)(a) (2013)). 
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Continental intended to deceive them,”153 it could not dispose of the 
fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit claims and could not find that 
reliance could not be shown through a summary judgment ruling.154 
Finally, Continental alleged the Fishers had not properly pled a claim 
for surface damages under North Dakota Century Code section 38.11.1-04; 
the Fishers responded that the request for monetary damages in their 
complaint encompassed a claim for statutory damages.155  The court first 
found that the Fisher’s complaint was sufficient to include the claim and 
that Continental would not be prejudiced by the complaint being so 
construed.156  The court additionally observed that whether North Dakota 
Century Code section 38-11.1-04 encompasses the determination of 
damages for use of the pore space underlying the surface of the affected 
tract remains an undecided issue under North Dakota law.157  The court 
declined to resolve that unsettled question at this point in the proceedings, 
and it denied Continental’s motion for summary judgment.158 
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